Caucasian Impasse

Armour rumbles in Georgia and European Union foreign policy coordination senses a chance to prove itself

The EU has expanded towards Russia's recently conceived 'ex-soviet space', both need to learn to appreciate each other's value, and values

It's safe to say that Europeans harbour a genuine uncertainty regarding Russia, in sum, the usual evaluation is one of hazardous opportunity. The potential of Russia's markets and resources are obvious to all, and to those who are weary of US foreign policy, Europe's vast neighbour holds the allure of a counterweight in international relations. On the other hand, Russia's swiftness to relish in and delpoy its military assets and speak bluntly in tense times showing no aversion to contributing to escalation jarrs with the more diplomatic and peace-loving European sensibilities.

These issues were reflected perfectly at the top level of EU Russia relations conducted in Sochi over the weekend 20-21 of september. Top of the agenda was the resumption of partnership negotiations between Brussels and Moscow in October which were halted by the conflict over Abkhazia and South Oessetia provided that Russian troops do indeed withdraw as Putin has assured they will. The good news didn't end there, there were also agreements on cooperation on environmental matters, energy efficiency and even on 2010 being respectively year of Russia anf France in each country. Such accord is worlds apart from the stance adopted by British PM Gordon Brown, who in his wisdom decided to warn Medvedev over the phone to expect a determined European response, Brown also supports excluding Russia from the G8 and reconsidering its relations with NATO. It is striking that the division between, for example, France and the UK over how to approach Russia in this follows two other divisions. Firstly, that while France has close and relatively good energy sector ties with Russian companies, the UK does not, and secondly, France has traditionally set itself apart from policies favoured by Washington, while the UK...does not. These are qualities that make the current French occupation of the Presidency of the EU favourable for its involvement in the peace initiative since the 5 Day War. Indeed, Sarkozy has played a very personal role in the negotiations with Georgia and Russia and trod a careful line between condemming the scale of Russian military response, projected deep into undistputed Georgian territory, while refusing to "get full of emotion and slam all the doors shut" as the German Foreign Minister put it. It is right to offer aid to the people of Georgia to repair the damage done to their country by the Russian armour which rolled through it, but it is also vital that relations with Moscow not become yet another of the conflict's casualties. Russia holds the keys to vast mineral wealth and energy resources, as well as representing a treasure trove of commercial opportunity to the nations of Europe, assets which the Russian state is very protective of and does not share readily and freely. Russia has the scope to choose its allies according to its potential as a trading partner and Europe would do very poorly out of jeapordising its access to this potential.

Trying to get some wind under foreign and security policy cooperation is a major challenge for the EU

In more fundamental terms, there is really very little for the EU to achieve in involving itself in this conflict. Georgia is not a Member State, nor is it a member of NATO, yet the EU has racked its nerves to find a common response to the events as a matter of policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy initiative is something that leaders have been trying to get off the ground for a long time now. If Europe could cooperate in this discipline and field resolute and united responses and stances to global events, then it would undoubtedly raise the prestige and political clout of the bloc. While Europe has no sense of having any kind of messianic mission to save humanity of the sort for which Russia and the USA are each famous for, Europeans do hate wars, regardless of the reasons behind them, and they love the leaders who can resolve them or avoid its spectre in the first place. Consequently, the persual of a Common Foreign and Security Policy mechanism is an attractive occupation not only for the real benefits of a Union wide collaboration in protecting EU citizens from the dangers of the day, but also for its potential in domestic popularity.

The EU needs to keep the lights on at home, and its doors as open as its options regarding Russia, energy and security

As discussed in 'sounds like sabre rattling', behind the flag-waving of this conflict lies a rivalry between the United States and Russia over access to and control over the oil and gas supply in the region. Materially, Europe has nothing to gain in entering that tussle, either Russia or the USA will win out before the EU is likely to, as the USA has the funds and political will to openly warp domestic politics in foreign countries to its advantage, and Russia is comfortable with standing its ground with the help of the gun barrel. In either outcome, the EU will be buying any energy resources that flow from the region from either Russian or American companies. As such, no amount of consternation in Europe over a common foreign policy stance is likely to make any difference to the final state of affairs on the ground.