Through the noise of firey UN Security Council exchanges, dispatches from Capitol Hill and the tutting in Europe's capitals, iDissent strains to hear a clear voice or two tell a fuller story
Russian military activity in Georgia, which broke out ostensibly over the break-away Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has over the past couple of weeks received sharp
condemnation from the transatlantic political community and sparked a
crisis summit of the EU. Russia has been portrayed in light of the four-day conflict as a wanton aggressor and a bully, violating the sovereignty of a pro-western country with aspirations to EU and NATO membership. The rhetoric has escalated even after the cessation of military actions, with Russian foreign minister telling the world to 'forget about' Georgian territorial integrity and threats from European leaders of frosty diplomatic times for Russia despite fears of reciprocation with an equally frosty winter for those dependent on her energy resources.
The regions under dispute, the window-dressing of the conflict
Background chatter
There are famously, however, two sides to every story, and often even more, especially to those about international relations and conflicts. Over the last couple of days I have been asking some Russian friends in Kiev and Moscow their opinions of the conflict and how the progress of Russian tanks up to the capital of another sovereign country can be defended and not considered shameless aggression. Each of whom I asked passionately defended Russia's position on the matter (and they are of different ages and backgrounds) and implored me not to take for granted the version of events and blame consumed in the west but to hear a little of the history of the region to understand the situation today. (When I say a little history, one of my contacts began his answer in the time of Alexander the Great, this is normal for Russian debates so I should have been expecting it, but at 2am on a Monday morning I wasn't sure whether to be flattered by the effort to educate me, or pass out in despair). You probably only have to have been paying average attention to BBC coverage of happenings in the Caucuses in recent years to appreciate that it is a compact region of great cultural and ethnic diversity. Its history is bloody and wild and riddled with intrigues, mutual distrust and demographic and religious tensions. These tensions, in a fashion comparable to that familiar to the people of the former Yugoslavia, were more incubated than abated in soviet times when territories were symbolically, though in practical terms meaninglessly, delineated along ethnic lines. Whether in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic or the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, it was all the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was one real state, and one army. Internal borders served only administrative purposes. All of this held the potential for a total nightmare when the time came to divide up the assets at the break-up of the Union. In the event, when Georgia established its full independence it found on its northern border Abkhazia and Ossetia (the north of which came within the borders of the Russian Federation, the south of which lies in Georgia), where many people recognised as Russians were resident. Ossetins have long standing ties to Russia as opposed to Georgia, as do Abkhazis and there is a genuine popularity amongst them for union with the Russian Federation.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili came in from America on a popularist nationalist platform
Initially, Georgia sought to secure its independence by asserting its authority here, but the armed forces in the region were deemed Russian, and life for Georgians became difficult. The President, Gamsakhrudia, was blamed and replaced by Edward Sheverdnadze who agreed to a mix of forces for the region to keep peace. Abkhazia began to attract investment from Russia, but improvements for Georgia proper failed to satisfy the Georgian population, and Mikhail Saakashvili became the new President in January 2004. Saakashvili brought with him an American education, American support and a nationalist popularist platform, promising to restore the soviet-era borders of his country. Why the American support? Both Russia and the United States, according to my civilian Russian contact, have a vested interest in the gas and oil resources and infrastructure of the region. Georgia also represents a non-muslim threshold to the Middle East, a potentially useful foreign policy launch-pad for the United States, and to Russia it presents a threat to their territorial integrity as well as a potential expansion of their share in global energy resources. Mikhail Saakashvili launched attacks on the territory of and civilian targets in South Ossetia, provoking retaliation from Russia. Such circumstances have naturally engendered the Ossetins and Abkhazis further toward Moscow and Moscow is happy to extend to them its support.
Sergey Lavrov. One man, one qoute, but how many edits and interpretations?
Distortion and interference
Separating the interested parties and their motivations makes the picture clearer. Moscow has an interest in halting what it sees as increased US involvement in the Caucuses not only for the sake of enhancing its own influence there by default, but also to consolidate its portfolio of gas and oil assets. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or rather the unification thereof with the Russian Federation, and the protection of Russian nationals therein, provide Moscow's ticket to that end. For the US, Georgia is an attractive partner in the region, strategically located to become a useful partner in NATO and buttress its supply of oil and gas. Given that, the answer to questions as to why the dispute over two moderately sized regions' autonomy cannot be settled peaceably in the UN becomes clear, there is more than that at stake for two of the Security Council's permanent members. The argument over Georgian territorial integrity, or the right of the Abkhazis and Ossetins to live in safety under Russian protection, are the PR sleeve photos of projects for the betterment of Washington and Moscow respectively. Given the above history of who-hit-who first it would appear that Russia actually commands the moral high-ground, though its height above sea-level depends upon your location in relation to Moscow, however the scale of Russia's advance into Georgia was undoubtedly for foreign consumption. In the vein of sabre-rattling it was intended to demonstrate that not only America can conceive of daring invasions into sovereign countries with the aim of regime change (Russia would no doubt be able to work with a Georgia that had as its President anyone they didn't feel had only Washington's interests at heart nor had in election campaigns promised to recapture territory that is now part of the Russian Federation). Furthermore, western allegations levelled against Russia of 'aggression' would undoubtedly carry more weight and credence (sending tanks through a sovereign nation's territory when not faced with a proportional, clear and direct threat amounts to the crime of aggression in international law) were it not the case that the US, UK and others have committed that very crime in Iraq.
Sergey Lavrov's statement "то, думаю, можно забыть о разговорах о территориальной целостности Грузии," that we can 'forget about Georgian territorial integrity', in its fullness, was actually confined to a state of conflict, and not an open threat as it is often presented and read in newspaper or online headlines. The other half of the qoute reads "...потому что заставить осетин и абхазов согласиться с такой логикой, что их можно силой вернуть в грузинское государство, для них будет невозможно" '...because to compel the Ossetins and Abkhazis to agree with the logic that they can be returned by force to the Georgian state, is impossible for them'. If any country needed to resort to the use of force against the people it wished to retain, in order to maintain its territorial integrity, everybody would recognise there was a problem with the word 'integrity'. At this stage in events that is definitely the case so Mr Lavrov's words are much more understandable, and less threatening, when heard in full.
As far as this European observer is concerned, however, Russia's high-handedness is ultimately gravely damaging. To regurgitate the appropriate hackneyed cliché, two wrongs do not make a right. Today Russia appears, through fault or mistake, or misinterpretation, to be engaged in precisely the sort of unilateral belligerence for which it has repeatedly chastised the United States under Bush, replete with the projection of force beyond its borders. If the dispute is over the status, security and integrity of two border provinces, there exist international bodies which have the capacity to oversee transparent processes in order to determine where the inhabitants of those regions wish to pursue their aspirations. Russia could have turned to any number of forums from the CIS to the UN to the Council of Europe to legitimise its claims in protecting its own citizens. Its unilateralism has concerned many European capitals (though tellingly, those with close energy ties to Moscow, notably Berlin and Paris, have the calmest of European outlooks on the situation) which carries the risk of Europe [as a whole] continuing to distrust Russia and side with the United States yet further.